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I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 14, 2008, the New York Times published an article titled CoPayments Go Way Up for Drugs With High Prices.1 The article focused on
the rising cost of prescription drugs, in particular it questioned the development of prescription drug formularies with four or more tiers (i.e., “specialty drug tiers”), which were developed by health insurance companies to
control rising costs associated with expensive specialty drugs.2 The article
1.
Gina Kolata, Co-Payments Go Way Up for Drugs With High Prices, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, at A1.
2.
See generally Bill Walsh, Strategic Analysis & Intelligence (SAI) Report, The
Tier 4 Phenomenon: Shifting the High Cost of Drugs to Consumers, AARP (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/tierfour.pdf (showing that historically, health plans used
a three-tier structure to determine an insured’s copayment amount for specific prescription
drugs—typically, a plan would have low cost drugs (such as generics) on Tier 1, preferred
brand-name drugs on Tier 2, and non-preferred brand-name drugs on Tier 3). Walsh notes
that common practice shows brand-name drugs with a generic equivalent are placed on the
third tier to encourage the use of lower cost generic medications. Id. at 5-6. Non-preferred
brand-name drugs may be placed on a third tier for two other reasons. First, because the
medication at issue does not have a greater clinical effectiveness when compared with similar medications for the same health condition placed on the second tier. Second, a medication may be deemed non-preferred by the health insurance plan because the health insurance
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recognized the need to control rising costs, but questioned whether the development of such tiers would lead to an increase in the number of persons
who could not afford such specialty medications. The New York Times article article was not a one-day story; rather, it began a national debate about
specialty prescription drugs and whether prescription drug formularies with
specialty drug tiers should be prohibited.3
The article was the first to expose a nascent trend in prescription drug
coverage benefit design – a trend that began in the mid-2000’s and continues to grow in popularity among employers and health insurance companies
in 2011.4 Health insurance companies will continue to add specialty drug
tiers because of the precipitous rise in the cost of certain specialty drugs,
and, more importantly, because employers and health insurance companies
are finding that specialty drug tiers are an effective method for controlling
rising costs.5
The New York Times article, however, did not view the evolution of
specialty drug tiers as a positive development. Instead, the article asserted
that the creation of specialty drug tiers was directly related to a steep rise in
the out-of-pocket costs people pay for specialty drugs.6 Furthermore, it was
reported that copayments7 for specialty drugs could reach “thousands of
dollars a month” under prescription drug formularies with specialty drug
tiers.8 Worse yet, these specialty drugs lacked lower-cost generic or brandplan and pharmaceutical company did not reach a mutual agreement on cost sharing, such as
a rebate agreement. See also Susan E. Cancelosi, Revisiting Employer Prescription Drug
Plans for Medicare-Eligible Retirees in the Medicare Part D Era, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 85, 107 (2005) (indicating that plans with four “or more” tiers had a minimal four
percent of the market share in 2004). The Cancelosi article shows that the marketplace already has some complex plans (having more than four tiers), but these benefit structures
were limited in number in 2005 and appear to be limited as of 2011.
3.
Walsh, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that specialty drugs are drugs used to treat
chronic or complex conditions and typically require special handling and care management).
4.
See Adam J. Fein, Big Growth in Four-Tier Drug Benefits, DRUG CHANNELS
(Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.drugchannels.net/2010/09/big-growth-in-four-tier-drugbenefits.html (last visited May 25, 2011); see also Jack Hoadley et al., Medicare Part D
2009 Data Spotlight: Specialty Drug Tiers, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (June
2009), http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7919.pdf (reporting that the vast majority of
Medicare Part D enrollees are in plans with specialty drug tiers as of 2009 and that more
than half of these beneficiaries were subject to thirty-three percent coinsurance for specialty
tier drugs).
5.
Kolata, supra note 1.
6.
Id.
7.
Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Insurance, 54 KAN. L.
REV. 73, 125 (2005) (describing cost-sharing mechanisms in health insurance: defining
coinsurance as a payment in which a consumer bears an indefinite obligation to pay a percentage of the charges for a service received and copayments as the consumer’s obligation to
pay a definite dollar amount).
8.
Kolata, supra note 1.
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name alternatives, thereby forcing consumers to face a difficult choice—
pay the higher copayment amounts, reduce taking necessary medications, or
stop taking medications altogether.9
Karen Ignagni, the President of America’s Health Insurance Plans, responded to the article. She noted that “[p]rivate insurers began offering
[specialty drug] plans in response to employers who were looking for ways
to keep costs down.”10 She further noted, “[w]hen people who need [specialty] drugs pay more for them, other subscribers in the [health insurance]
plan pay less for their coverage.”11 Dr. James Robinson, a health economist
at the University of California at Berkley, strongly disagreed with Ignagni
and called the emergence of formularies that target specialty drugs “unfortunate social policy” and “an erosion of the traditional concept of insurance.”12
The New York Times article illustrated a real life example of the hardship a person can suffer when their health insurance company implements a
prescription drug formulary that targets certain specialty drugs. Ms. Steinwald, previously diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, was prescribed Copaxone.13 This particular specialty drug costs about $1900 per month.14 Before
the specialty tier formulary was created, Steinwald’s copayment for her
Copaxone was only $20 per month (her insurer paid the balance of the
drug’s actual cost).15 When her health insurance company moved to a formulary that placed specialty drugs on a fourth benefit tier, Steinwald’s
monthly copayment increased to $325 a month—meaning her annual outof-pocket cost jumped to $3900 for one prescription medication.16
9.
Id. at A17.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id. The “traditional concept of insurance” referred to by Dr. Robinson is “risk
spreading.” For further discussion on risk spreading, see TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND
POLICY 2 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that risk spreading, a core concept in the design of insurance
benefits, occurs when an insurer takes on risk of an individual person but then parcels that
risk among all people in the insurance pool. The idea is that every person in the group will
pay a similar premium cost; however, that cost will be large enough to build a pot of money
able to sustain the system when high cost claims are submitted by a small number of people
within the larger group).
13.
Kolata, supra note 1. The article published on April 14, 2008 inferred that Copaxone, a medication used to treat conditions associated with multiple sclerosis, was taken in
pill form. However, it was not taken in pill form. Accordingly, the New York Times published a correction on April 15, 2008 to clarify that Copaxone is a medication that is administered via an injection—it is not taken orally. Gina Kolata, Co-Payments Soar for Drugs
With
High
Prices,
N.Y.
TIMES,
April
15,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/14/us/14drug.html?pagewanted=all (correction appended
to online version of article).
14.
Kolata, supra note 1.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
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Shortly after the New York Times story was published, Senate Democratic leader Malcolm A. Smith and other members of the New York State
Senate Democratic Conference announced the introduction of legislation
that, if enacted, would prevent health insurers from establishing prescription drug formularies that target specialty drugs.17 The Democratic Conference voiced their opposition to specialty drug tiers and asserted that specialty tier pricing would “unfairly shift the burden to consumers.”18 Senator
Smith added that the caucus would “do all [it could] to make sure that
health care remains accessible and affordable.”19 The New York Department of Insurance, in response to Senator Smith’s announcement, added
that the state agency had yet to approve any specialty tier formularies and
that none were being utilized in the State of New York.20
Despite the forceful stance taken at the press conference in 2008, it
took New York nearly three more years to pass a law prohibiting specialty
drug tiers. In October 2010, Governor David Patterson signed into law legislation sponsored by New York Assembly Member Micah Z. Kellner (DManhattan) and State Senator Tom Duane (D-New York) that will prevent
health insurance companies from raising the out-of-pocket cost to consumers of more expensive medications.21 New York’s ban on specialty drug
tiers received national attention because it was the first time a state law
prohibited such practices. As a result, similar efforts have been introduced
in several other states, including Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.22
17.
Senate Democrats Move to Ban Tier 4 Prescription Drug Pricing Plan, LONG
ISL. NEWS, Apr. 23, 2009, available at http://www.newsli.com/2008/04/23/senatedemocrats-move-to-ban-tier-4-prescription-drug-pricing-plan/.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
See 2010 N.Y. Laws 536 (signed into law on October 1, 2010).
22.
See, e.g., Arizona, S.B. 1594, 2011 Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2011); California, A.B.
310, 2011 Leg., 2011-12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); Connecticut, H.B. 1084, 2011 Leg., Jan.
Sess. (Conn. 2011); Hawaii, S.C.R. 93, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011); Kansas, H.B.
2136, 2011 Leg., 2011-12 Sess. (Kan. 2011); Maryland, H.B. 251, 429th Gen. Assemb.,
2011 Sess. (Md. 2011) and S.B. 709, 429th Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (Md. 2011); Massachusetts, S. 455, 187th Gen. Ct., 2011 Sess. (Mass. 2011); Nebraska, L.B. 322, 102 Leg., 1st
Sess. (Neb. 2011); New Mexico, S.B. 536, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2011); Pennsylvania
(On May 9, 2011, Rep. Mike Vereb announced a plan to introduce legislation banning specialty drug tiers and called for colleagues to join his effort by sending a letter to all members
of the state house. See Memorandum from Rep. Michael A. Vereb, Republican Leadership
Caucus Sec’y, to All Pennsylvania House Members on Proposed Legislation—Specialty
Tiers (May 9, 2011), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/CSM/2011/0/8318.pdf); Rhode
Island, H. 5568, 2011 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2011); Vermont, H. 202, 2011-12 Leg. Sess. (Vt.
2011), and S.B. 57, 2011-12 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2011); Virginia, H.J. 579, 2011 Sess. (Va.
2011); and Washington, H.B. 1876, 2011-12 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
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Despite New York’s new law and the efforts underway in thirteen
other states,23 specialty drug tiers may already be unlawful under the antidiscrimination provisions in the federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).24 HIPAA, as informed by its legislative history and the Final Rule implementing the law, rejects benefit limitations based upon an individual’s health status.25 Applied to specialty drug
tiers, the question is whether specialty drug tiers that, by definition, group
together a limited number of people with specifically identifiable medical
conditions or diseases, with the knowing intent to charge the members of
that particular group higher copayments for their specialty drugs, improperly discriminate under HIPAA based on health status. The answer, although not clear, is found in the HIPAA’s statutory language, legislative
history, and commentary provided in the Final Rules.26
This Article will analyze whether specialty drug tiers violate HIPAA.
This is a question of first impression—no federal or state court decision
provides an answer. Part II of this Article provides relevant background
material. We begin with a discussion about the development of prescription
drug coverage in the United States and the emergence of drug tiers as a
cost-saving mechanism.
In Part III of this Article, we begin with an historical overview of accepted discrimination and risk classification within insurance. Next, we
discuss HIPAA’s statutory language, legislative history, and key parts of
the Final Rule implementing the law. We also address the impact of national health care reform under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (“Affordable Care Act”).27 Based on the foregoing, we will argue that
HIPAA, its statutory history, and the relevant federal regulations demonstrate that specialty drug tiers violate HIPAA’s anti-discrimination provisions, yet we acknowledge that reasonable minds could differ on that conclusion. Therefore, we note that courts, regulators, and legislators may have
to ask and answer certain questions. What is good public policy? Should
courts or regulators act or leave the question unresolved and wait for Congress to act? Generally, statutes regulating the business of insurance do not
23.
In Virginia, H.J. 579 does not propose a ban on specialty drug tiers; rather, the
measure directs the Joint Commission on Health Care to study the impacts of cost sharing,
coinsurance, and specialty tier pricing for prescription medications. See H.J. 579, 2011 Sess.
(Va. 2011).
24.
29 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006).
25.
See id.
26.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014 (Dec. 13, 2006) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 146).
27.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010); Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010) [collectively referred to as the Affordable Care Act].
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prevent all discrimination, only unfair discrimination.28 If specialty tier
formularies do not violate HIPAA’s anti-discrimination provisions specifically, are these benefit structures still wholly inconsistent with the overall
legislative intent of HIPAA—to improve the portability and continuity of
health coverage for all insured Americans?29 To conclude this Part, we argue that specialty drug tiers should be universally rejected because such
drug plans not only violate HIPAA, but are inconsistent with HIPAA’s
broader goals of ensuring that Americans continue to have access to affordable health insurance benefits and repudiating discrimination on the basis of
an insured’s health status. Additionally, such drug tiers fail to satisfy the
basic principles of insurance, do not further the same salutary social goals
as traditional prescription drug formularies (i.e., formularies with three
tiers), and adversely affect patient access to specialty drugs.
In Part IV of this Article, we conclude that legislators and regulators
should promote the public policy used to pass HIPAA into law and exercise
their authority to end the proliferation of specialty tier drug plans.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EMERGENCE OF SPECIALTY DRUG TIERS
PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFITS IN HEALTH INSURANCE

The cost of prescription drugs has been a national problem since the
1960s.30 During that decade, relatively few private health insurance plans
offered prescription drug coverage.31 In 1965, Congress enacted Medicare
and Medicaid, but only Medicaid included a prescription drug benefit.32
When a health insurance company offered prescription drug coverage, coverage was minimal.33 The typical plan imposed many limits—such as coinsurance, high deductibles, and low annual maximums—making the coverage little help to the insured population.34
In 1967, the first employer-sponsored prescription drug benefit was established as a result of negotiations between the United Auto Workers

28.
Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actually Fair? A
Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355 (1997).
29.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014 (Dec. 13, 2006) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 146).
30.
Cancelosi, supra note 2, at 105.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.; see also Medicare: A National Treasure for Forty Years, MED. RTS. CENTER
(July 2005), http://www.medicarerights.org/pdf/Medicare_A_National_Treasure.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2011).
33.
Cancelosi, supra note 2, at 105.
34.
Id.
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(UAW) union and General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford.35 By the late 1970s,
most employer-sponsored health plans included a prescription drug benefit.36 However, prescription drug coverage was typically part of the overall
plan and not viewed as a separate benefit, subjecting prescription drug costs
to the same deductibles and co-insurance as the plan’s general medical
benefits.37 By 2004, most employer-sponsored prescription drug benefit
plans included cost-saving mechanisms, such as prescription drug formularies.38
B.

PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT TIERS

1.

The Development of the Traditional Three-Tier Prescription Drug
Formulary

Historically, a treating physician exclusively determined what prescription drugs were necessary to treat a disorder; thus, patients were without sufficient knowledge of specific drugs to have any input into the specific drug-prescribing decision.39 Around the mid-1990s, consumers started
to demand specific brand-name drugs from their health care providers.40
The increased demand for brand-name drugs was attributed to a “tremendous increase” in advertising by drug manufacturers.41 Health plan administrators, alarmed by the rise in brand-name utilization, looked for new ways
to influence the behavior of health insurance beneficiaries in order to
counter the impact that advertising was having on patient behavior, and to
reign in the rapidly growing costs associated with prescription drug benefit
plans.42
Health plan administrators established the modern model for copayments, placing a varying copayment amount that a health insurance beneficiary must pay for a particular prescription, which would increase based on
the cost of the drug and whether it had a generic equivalent. Previously,
most beneficiaries paid a standard five dollar charge for any prescription

35.
Id. at 106.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Cancelosi, supra note 2, at 106.
39.
The development of the learned intermediary rule that insulated drug companies
from tort liability if their drug caused harm was a reflection of this knowledge disparity. See,
e.g., Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 199-205 (2004).
40.
Cancelosi, supra note 2, at 111.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 107.
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medication, without regard to the type or cost of the particular drug.43 In
addition to copayments, health plans began to develop formularies44 that
separated prescription drugs into different tiers. The goal of the new formularies was to achieve cost savings by charging beneficiaries more for prescription drugs placed on a higher-level tier and thereby encourage the use
of lower-cost generic medications.45
A three-tier prescription drug formulary became the most common
structure. Generally, three-tier formularies separate prescription drugs as
follows: Tier 1 includes low-cost generic medications, Tier 2 includes
brand-name drugs without generic substitutes, and Tier 3 includes brandname drugs with generic substitutes.46 In regard to costs, Tier 1 drugs have
“the lowest copayments ($10 or less)” and generally include only generic
drugs.47 Tier 2 drugs have “higher copayments ($15 or more)” and include
“‘preferred’” brand-name drugs.48 Tier 3 drugs have “the highest copayments ($25 or more)” and include “non-preferred” brand-name drugs.49
Preferred drugs are usually prescription medications for which a generic
equivalent is not available but still have a lower cost because the health
insurance company previously negotiated favorable rebate agreements with
drug manufacturers (rebate agreements, in theory, reduce the cost of drugs
for insureds but benefit a drug manufacturer by securing increased market
share within a specific insurance pool).50
According to one observer, the goal of “incentive-based formularies
[was] to encourage people to choose lower-cost prescription drugs, thereby
creating cost savings for the health plan.”51 The main assumption underlying the early three-tier structures was that consumers had a choice between
medications for the same disease or health condition; that is, a chemically
43.
Cindy Parks Thomas, Incentive-Based Formularies, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2186 (2003).
44.
See Health Resources and Services Administration Glossary of PharmacyRelated
Terms,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVS,
http://www.hrsa.gov/opa/glossary.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2009) (defining a “formulary” as
“a preferred list of drug products that typically limits the number of drugs available within a
therapeutic class for purposes of drug purchasing, dispensing and/or reimbursement. A government body, third-party insurer or health plan, or an institution may compile a formulary.
Some institutions or health plans develop closed (i.e. restricted) formularies where only
those drug products listed can be dispensed in that institution or reimbursed by the health
plan. Other formularies may have no restrictions (open formulary) or may have certain restrictions such as higher patient cost-sharing requirements for off-formulary drugs.”).
45.
Id.
46.
Cancelosi, supra note 2.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Thomas, supra note 43, at 2187.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 2186.
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equivalent, lower-cost choice (most likely a generic drug) was available in
place of a higher-cost, brand-name medication.52 Moreover, the creation of
three-tier plans was consistent with the insurance industry’s long-standing
objective to minimize moral hazards.53 Insurance companies, therefore, find
that it is reasonable to create programs that encourage consumers to make
more-informed, cost-conscious choices. In the prescription drug context,
policies that discourage beneficiaries from choosing higher-cost brandname drugs over a generic equivalent minimize moral hazards in health
insurance.
Nevertheless, it is imperative to note that under a traditional three-tier
prescription drug formulary, a beneficiary is given a choice between more
and less expensive equivalent medications for the same disease or health
condition. Thus, a beneficiary who is prescribed a Tier 3 drug can decide
that he or she does not want to pay the higher copayment and find a chemically equivalent drug at a lower cost on Tiers 1 or 2. Three-tier plans, therefore, have at least the following salutary effects: (1) they provide a tool to
discourage beneficiaries from making choices that lead to utilization of
higher-cost drugs (i.e., discourage moral hazards); (2) they reduce demand
for brand-name drugs that was exacerbated by drug company advertising;
(3) they move away from undifferentiated drug copayments and help control costs; (4) they offer beneficiaries a choice of medications for a particular disease or condition that vary in cost but not in effectiveness; and (5)
because they lower a health insurance company’s overall cost to provide
insurance, they allow the health insurance company to increase the number
of persons who can access insurance benefits and/or lower insurance costs
for the individuals already in the insurance pool.54

52.
A generic drug is “a medication whose active ingredients, safety, dosage, quality, and strength are identical to that of its brand-name counterparts . . . [y]ou can expect the
generic drug to produce the same effects as the comparable brand-name drug.” See Glossary
of Terms and Acronyms, PARAMOUNT HEALTH CARE (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://www.paramounthealthcare.com/documents/employers/Glossary-of-Terms.pdf.
53.
See BAKER, supra note 12, at 4 (describing that “in the insurance context . . .
‘moral hazard’ typically is used to refer to the theoretical tendency for insurance to reduce
incentives (1) to protect against loss or (2) to minimize the cost of a loss.”). As an example,
the author explains that moral hazard is “leaving a car door unlocked, comfortable in the
knowledge that if the car is stolen the insurance company will pay.” Id. Likewise, in a health
insurance context, the same would be true when an insured does not care about the type or
amount of drugs prescribed or the cost difference between a generic and brand-name equivalent medication because the insurance company covers the bulk of the cost. See id. Formulary tiers were designed to combat moral hazard in the insured’s decision when choosing
medications. See id.
54.
Thomas, supra note 43, at 2187 (noting that incentive-based formularies slowed
the growth of pharmaceutical expenditures, highlighting one example where an insurer saw
thirty percent savings in overall drug expenditures by moving to a three-tier plan).
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Despite the noted advantages, three-tier formularies have not avoided
criticism. Early critics of three-tier plans argued that “incentive-based formularies [could] affect access to care and the quality of care.”55 These critics asked an important question: Should cost be the only factor driving the
design of prescription drug formularies, or should the scope of the analysis
include other factors, such as health outcomes and the total impact on the
cost of medical services?56 This question becomes even more relevant
now—when health insurance companies continue to add new tiers that target specialty drugs. From a cost control view, when a beneficiary pays more
for specialty drugs, the insurance company is able to lower its risk and increase the likelihood that the company will remain viable for all beneficiaries in the insurance pool. On the other hand, placing extreme cost control
measures on specialty drugs could discourage use of prescription drugs and
possibly lead to bad health outcomes for specific beneficiaries. In this scenario, the ultimate effect on the health insurance company may increase
costs even further due to hospitalizations, prolonged treatment courses, et
cetera, that could have been avoided by making specialty drugs accessible
to plan beneficiaries.
2.

Specialty Drug Tiers

Prescription drugs are often expensive, and historically, proposals
aimed at controlling costs have been accepted. For example, drugs commonly placed on Tier 3 of a three-tier formulary are brand-name drugs for
which an acceptable and equivalent generic, or lower-cost brand-name,
medication is available.57 Schemes to encourage the use of the lower-cost
generics made sense in an era experiencing rapidly rising prescription drug
prices and unchecked consumerism. Three-tier formularies properly encouraged consumers to choose generics over brand-name drugs and avoid
moral hazard by ending consumer indifference to costs related to the type
and amount of drugs prescribed by their treating physician. Although price
constraints were used, consumers still had several choices for their specific
disease or condition and were ensured access to necessary prescription
drugs. The strategy also worked to counter advertising efforts by pharmaceutical companies that were promoting higher-cost, brand-name drugs.58
Health plans and employers, pleased that formularies were successful
at modifying beneficiary decision-making and saving money, wanted fur55.
Id. at 2188.
56.
Id.
57.
Walsh, supra note 2, at 6.
58.
Cancelosi, supra note 2, at 112 (noting a slow-down in direct-to-consumer
advertising).
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ther refinements to their formularies and additional cost savings.59 In 2004,
58% of employer-sponsored plans with prescription drug coverage used a
three-tier formulary structure.60 Only 4% of employers offered a plan with
four or more tiers.61 In comparison, a report published by the AARP in
March 2009 revealed that, five years later, 10% of health insurance plans
offered a prescription drug benefit that placed specialty drugs on a fourth
tier.62 By 2010, an industry analyst studying 2,046 health insurance companies found that 13% of employer-sponsored plans had four or more tiers in
their prescription drug formulary.63
Unlike the first three tiers, specialty drugs appearing on specialty drug
tiers (i.e., Tiers 4 and higher) do not have generic or lower-cost brand-name
equivalents and represent some of the most expensive medications in the
marketplace.64 Biological drugs—those derived from living organisms and
which are commonly injectable—make up the majority of drugs placed on
specialty drug tiers.65 The AARP analysis found that “the average annual
price of the most widely used biologic drugs on a fourth tier exceeds
$20,000.”66 As the New York Times article highlighted, many Americans
“may have to spend more for a drug than they pay for their mortgages,
more, in some cases, than their monthly incomes.”67
Prescription drug formularies with specialty drug tiers are significantly
different than the traditional three-tier formularies. Specialty drug tiers do
not include drugs with lower-cost generic equivalents; instead, these higherlevel tiers focus on unique medications that do not have generic equivalents. Specialty drug tiers accomplish nothing more than a blatant cost-shift
to beneficiaries—thereby placing a much more severe financial burden on
limited groups of persons within an insurance pool. Because a less expensive alternative drug is not available on Tiers 1, 2, or 3, specialty drug tiers
cannot alter consumer behavior and fail to address moral hazard concerns.
Specialty drug tiers are additionally distinguishable from lower tiers
because they disproportionately burden the sickest and most physically and
emotionally vulnerable members within an insurance pool (targeting a limited group of persons with higher-cost health conditions). The majority of
specialty medications address a limited range of complex diseases or health
59.
Crossley, supra note 7.
60.
Cancelosi, supra note 2.
61.
Id.
62.
Walsh, supra note 2, at 8.
63.
See Adam J. Fein, Big Growth in Four-Tier Drug Benefits, DRUG CHANNELS
(Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.drugchannels.net/2010/09/big-growth-in-four-tier-drugbenefits.html.
64.
Walsh, supra note 2, at 5.
65.
Id. at 8.
66.
Id.
67.
Kolata, supra note 1.
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conditions—mostly cancer, AIDS, rheumatoid arthritis, hemophilia, and
multiple sclerosis.68 Targeting specific high-cost medications that address a
narrow set of health conditions, and subsequently charging higher copayments via specialty drug tiers, walks a razor-thin line between socially acceptable, facially neutral insurance risk classifiers and unacceptable discrimination based on immutable characteristics of insured beneficiaries. For
the reasons that follow, we find that specialty drug tiers are improper, and
legislators, regulators, and courts should move aggressively to prohibit specialty drug tiers.
III. RISK CLASSIFICATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE
GENERALLY
A.

DISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE GENERALLY

Discrimination, in the broadest sense, is defined as the treatment or
consideration of, or making a distinction in favor of or against, a person or
thing based on the group, class, or category to which that person or thing
belongs rather than on individual merit.69 In the insurance context, discrimination occurs every day. For example, insurers charge smokers higher
premiums for life insurance than nonsmokers and charge males higher rates
for auto insurance than similarly aged females.70 This practice, known as
“risk classification,” allows an insurer to charge persons different amounts
of money according to predictions concerning how often, and at what cost,
each individual will make insurance claims in the future.71
Risk classification is certainly discrimination, but in the context of insurance, not all discrimination is wrong, unjustifiable, or illegal. Insurance
risk classification is typically justified on economic grounds, that is, discrimination between insured beneficiaries can be justified in order to avoid
adverse selection.72 Adverse selection is a theory asserting that pricing insurance at the same rate for everyone in society, without identifying individuals who are high-risk, encourages only the unhealthy to purchase insurance, making the business of insurance unprofitable and ultimately unavailable to everyone.73 As a result, defenders of risk classification argue that

68.
Walsh, supra note 2, at 3.
69.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (9th ed. 2009).
70.
BAKER, supra note 12, at 705, 707.
71.
Id. at 705.
72.
Id.
73.
Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1223-24 (2004).
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charging different rates for insurance, with price dictated by a person’s risk
level, is necessary to continue offering everyone affordable insurance.74
Further, a practice such as risk-based insurance pricing is deemed fair
if it is “actuarially fair.”75 The principle of actuarial fairness mandates that
an insurance beneficiary bear a financial responsibility commensurate with
his or her specific risk and that “each person’s insurance premium should
reflect that person’s actuarially determined risk—no more and no less.”76 A
health insurance market that accepts the actuarial fairness view of insurance, consequently, will favor policies that segment individuals into specific insurance pools based on an assignment of risk no matter how great
the financial burden is on those unfortunate enough to be unhealthy.77 Supporters of risk classification, therefore, assert that assigning appropriate
costs for high-risk and low-risk populations is fair.78 Under a fairness theory, the higher cost for insurance should give high-risk consumers an incentive to alter their behavior or situation in order to remove or mitigate their
high-risk classification.79
Insurers’ attempts to identify risk characteristics, however, can lead to
disparate-impact discrimination.80 Disparate-impact discrimination occurs
when a facially neutral practice or policy disproportionately and adversely
affects a group of people sharing a similar characteristic.81 For example, an
insurance company sells an identical policy to a man and a woman that
excludes coverage for breast cancer.82 The policy, on its face, treats the man
and woman equally in that neither can receive coverage for breast cancer.83
However, the policy, as applied, affects women in much larger numbers
than men and will be found as discriminatory.84
The recent trend to place high-cost drugs on specialty drug tiers as a
cost-control measure could be viewed as a form of risk classification. A
specific tier for specialty medications identifies particular high-cost drugs
and places those drugs into a special group (Tier 4 or 5). Rather than charge
everyone in the entire insured group a higher premium due to the use of
specialty drugs, a prescription drug formulary with a specialty tier charges
more only to those insureds that will actually use the specialty drugs. Pro74.
BAKER, supra note 12, at 705.
75.
Id. at 706.
76.
Crossley, supra note 7, at 78; see also Spencer L. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 83, 105 (1979).
77.
Crossley, supra note 7, at 78.
78.
BAKER, supra note 12, at 706.
79.
Id.
80.
Crossley, supra note 7, at 83.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
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ponents argue that the plan based the assignment of a drug to a specialty tier
based on the nature and cost of the drug, not any characteristic of any persons in the insured group. Therefore, the use of a specialty tier in a drug
benefit program can appear to be facially neutral.
Unquestionably, though, specialty drug tiers have a clear, disparate
impact on beneficiaries, and appear to be actuarially unfair and unacceptable discrimination. Health conditions requiring many of the drugs placed
on specialty drug tiers are “breakthrough” drugs that treat “cancer, MS,
AIDS, [rheumatoid] arthritis[,] [and] kidney disease.”85 Higher copayments
that result from placing these drugs on a specialty tier cannot be justified on
the contention that mandating a higher copayment may alter the insured’s
behavior since the beneficiary cannot switch to a lower-cost alternative.
Furthermore, it cannot be argued that a person with one of these higher-cost
conditions is under the person’s control. For example, it is inappropriate to
compare a person who is a smoker and, as a result, has higher health care
costs due to his or her voluntary choice to start and continue smoking with a
person who needs a specialty drug and whose need for such a drug is not
attributable to previous or existing behaviors that increase risk. Thus, charging a higher copayment to a person diagnosed with a kidney disease who
needs a specialty drug will not alter any aspect of his or her behavior.
Moreover, due to the nature of the drugs placed in specialty drug tiers, only
the most vulnerable beneficiaries are affected. Specialty drug tiers place a
significant burden on the sickest members of the insurance pool, placing
unreasonable obstacles on people when the most important task is obtaining
potentially life-saving drugs. The facially neutral identifiers, notably cost or
drug characteristic, have a disparate impact that has the effect of segregating the insured group based on specific disease states, such as by health
status.
If indeed the addition of specialty drug tiers segregates a subgroup of
the insured population by health status, the question becomes whether the
group identified and discriminated against is a group that is legally protected from discrimination. One group of persons who have been “[n]otably
absent” from protection are persons having a similar health status,86 at least
until Congress addressed this concern when it passed HIPAA in 1996.87
Congress enacted HIPAA on August 21, 1996.88 Congress intended to
“address the fears that voters would lose their health insurance when they
really needed it”89 and wanted HIPAA to focus “on addressing the security
85.
Walsh, supra note 2, at 2.
86.
Crossley, supra note 7, at 108.
87.
Id. at 113-14.
88.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936.
89.
Crossley, supra note 7, at 113.
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and portability of health insurance coverage.”90 In addition, Congress
wanted to “further reassure insured [Americans that] the law also prohibits
group health insurers from discriminating against individual participants on
the basis of health status in establishing eligibility rules and setting premiums.”91
HIPAA prohibits a group health plan or health insurance issuer from
discriminating against individual participants on several enumerated health
status-related factors.92 For example, a plan or issuer is not allowed to create plan policies for eligibility, or continued eligibility, based on an individual’s health status or medical condition.93 A plan or issuer, while making
an initial coverage determination, cannot reject an application for insurance
coverage because the individual applicant, or one of his or her beneficiaries,
has AIDS.94 A plan or issuer is also not allowed to create a policy that says
an individual loses coverage if that individual, or a beneficiary of that individual, develops AIDS during the policy year.95
HIPAA Section 1182(a)(2) looks beyond eligibility, or continued eligibility, determinations and states that a plan or issuer is not mandated to
provide coverage for a particular benefit, nor is the plan prohibited from
limiting the “amount, level, extent, or nature of the benefits or coverage for
similarly situated individuals.”96 The statute does not define the key phrase
“similarly situated individuals”; however, the legislative history is informative.97

90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 114.
92.
29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (2006).
93.
Id.
94.
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-736, at 186 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990, 1999.
95.
It is common in government benefits to remove a person from coverage if a
certain event occurs. For example, a person who has an income above annual income thresholds is not eligible for state-sponsored pharmacy benefits in Illinois. If a presently eligible
beneficiary wins the lottery, making their income exceed the pre-determined income ceiling,
the beneficiary loses eligibility for the benefit. Thus, the beneficiaries’ continuing eligibility
for the benefit ends and coverage is terminated. For a federal example, Social Security disability benefits end during coverage if (1) the person is determined to be no longer disabled
or (2) the person gains employment that increases their income above a pre-determined
level. In the HIPAA anti-discrimination context, a plan or issuer cannot design a benefit that
ends coverage mid-year because of a change in an individual’s health status. Unlike government benefits, it is unacceptable under HIPAA to cover an individual on January 1st but
remove the individual from coverage one month later when he or she is diagnosed with
AIDS.
96.
29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2006).
97.
Because the statutory language on its face does not explicitly resolve whether
specialty tier pharmaceutical benefit plans are discrimination under HIPAA, and because
there is no case law adding clarity to the statutory language, a court would likely examine
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In the conference agreement, Congress indicated that:
It is the intent of the conferees that a plan cannot knowingly be designed to exclude individuals and their dependents on the basis of health status. However, generally applicable terms of the plan may have a disparate impact on
individual enrollees. For example, a plan may exclude all
coverage of a specific condition, or may include a lifetime
cap on all benefits, or a lifetime cap on specific benefits.
Although individuals with the specific condition would be
adversely affected by a lifetime cap on all or specific benefits, . . . such plan characteristics would be permitted as
long as they are not directed at individual sick employees
or dependents.
The Conference agreement does not require a group health
plan or health insurance coverage to provide particular
benefits other than those provided under the terms of the
plan or coverage. Nor does it prevent any plan or coverage
from establishing limitations or restrictions on the amount,
level, extent, or nature of the benefits or coverage for similarly situated individuals enrolled in the plan or coverage . .
..
It is the intent of the conferees that a plan or coverage cannot single out an individual based on the health status or
health status related factors of that individual . . . . For example, the plan or coverage may not deny coverage for
prescription drugs to a particular beneficiary or dependent
if such coverage is available to other similarly situated individuals covered under the plan or coverage. However, the
plan or coverage could deny coverage for prescription
drugs to all beneficiaries and dependents. The term “similarly situated” means that a plan or coverage would be
permitted to vary benefits available to different groups of
employees, such as full-time versus part-time employees . .
. in different geographic locations. In addition, a plan or
coverage could have different benefit schedules for different collective bargaining units.

legislative history. See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.,
530 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2000).
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The conference agreement provides that a group health
plan and an issuer offering group coverage cannot require a
premium or contribution which is greater than such premium or contribution for a similarly situated individual enrolled in the plan on the basis of any health status-related
factor relating to the individual or to any individual enrolled under the plan as a dependent of the individual. It
does not restrict the amount that an employer may be
charged for coverage under a group health plan . . . .
The conferees intend that these provisions preclude insurance companies from denying coverage to employers based
on health status and related factors that they have traditionally used. In addition, this provision is meant to prohibit insurers or employers from excluding employees in a group
from coverage or charging them higher premiums based on
their health status and other related factors that could lead
to higher health costs. This does not mean that an entire
group cannot be charged more. But it does preclude health
plans from singling out individuals in the group for higher
premiums or dropping them from coverage altogether.98
It is abundantly clear that health insurers are not required to cover all
services or medications. As the conference report plainly states, “a plan
may exclude all coverage of a specific condition, or may include a lifetime
cap on all benefits, or a lifetime cap on specific benefits.”99
The conference report also states that HIPAA does not “prevent any
plan or coverage from establishing limitations or restrictions on the amount,
level, extent, or nature of the benefits or coverage for similarly situated
individuals enrolled in the plan or coverage.”100 According to the conference agreement, similarly situated means “that a plan or coverage would be
permitted to vary benefits available to different groups of employees, such
as full-time versus part time . . . or employees in different geographic locations . . . or coverage could have different benefit schedules for different
collective bargaining units.”101
HIPAA, and its legislative history, does not directly answer the question whether specialty drug tiers violate the anti-discrimination provisions.
In fact, the Act seems internally contradictory and raises more questions
98.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-736, at 186-87 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990, 1999-2000.
99.
Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
100.
Id. at 187.
101.
Id.
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than it provides answers when the anti-discrimination provisions are applied to specialty tier drug plans. For example, if the anti-discrimination
provisions allow a plan or coverage to entirely exclude specialty medications, how is it possible that including a financially limited coverage, such
as a fourth-tier specialty drug benefit, becomes a violation of the Act?
Omitting a drug or service from coverage unquestionably applies equally to
every person in the insurance pool; however, once an insurance company
decides to add a benefit to a plan or coverage, it must ensure that its benefit
structure does not improperly discriminate. If a plan covers 1000 people,
and all 1000 people are subjected to the specialty tier formulary structure, it
would seem that no discrimination occurred. On the other hand, if a plan
covering 1000 people determined, through its actuaries, that ten people on
the plan were using a costly medication and subsequently created a specialty tier, the HIPAA anti-discrimination provisions could be violated because the new tier might be seen as a reaction to claims by individual plan
beneficiaries. In this hypothetical, the plan created two distinct groups—the
first group of ten being those who need the medication and the second
group of 990 being those who do not need the medication. Does HIPAA
contemplate the grouping of people within a plan or coverage who need
specialty medications as one group and those who do not as another group?
Are these groups similar to or different than full-time versus part-time employees?
With the statute itself not directly answering the question whether specialty tier plans violate the HIPAA anti-discrimination provisions, and with
the legislative history providing some support to both sides of the question,
we now turn to the federal regulations and/or subregulatory guidance interpreting HIPAA.
1.

Federal Regulations and Other Guidance

The most instructive evidence of Congress’s intent on what activities
are discriminatory under HIPAA is found in the Commentary to the Final
Rule completing HIPAA’s implementation.102 Part 2590 of the rulemaking
provides additional guidance on discrimination against participants and
beneficiaries based on a health factor.103 HIPAA provides that benefits provided under a plan or through group health insurance coverage must be
uniformly available to all similarly situated individuals.104 The Final Rule’s
Commentary, in relation to discrimination as it applies to the application of
102.
Market, 71
146).
103.
104.

See Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,038-40 (Dec. 13, 2006) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
Id.
Id.
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benefits, provides additional guidance on the meaning of this language.105
The basic rule shows that benefits provided must be uniformly available to
similarly situated individuals, and likewise, restrictions on benefits must
also apply uniformly to all similarly situated individuals. The Final Rule
Commentary provides:
[A] plan or issuer may limit or exclude benefits in relation
to a specific disease or condition, limit or exclude benefits
for certain types of treatments or drugs, or limit or exclude
benefits based on a determination of whether the benefits
are experimental or not medically necessary, but, only if
the benefit limitation or exclusion applies uniformly to all
similarly situated individuals, and is not directed at individual participants or beneficiaries based on any health factor of the participants or beneficiaries.106
The Commentary further provides:
[A] plan or issuer may impose annual, lifetime, or other
limits on benefits and may require satisfaction of a deductible, copayment, coinsurance, or other cost-sharing requirement in order to obtain a benefit if the limit or costsharing requirement applies uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and is not directed at individual participants or beneficiaries based on any health factor of the participants or beneficiaries.107
At Section 2590.702(b)(2), the Final Rule provides eight examples of
situations which are either permitted or violate the non-discrimination provisions of HIPAA.108 The examples are intended to guide the analysis of
future legal questions. Four of the examples provide guidance when determining whether specialty drug tiers are discriminatory:
Example 2. (i) Facts. A group health plan has a $2 million
lifetime limit on all benefits (and no other lifetime limits)
for participants covered under the plan. Participant B files a
claim for the treatment of AIDS. At the next corporate
board meeting of the plan sponsor, the claim is discussed.
Shortly thereafter, the plan is modified to impose a $10,000
105.
Id.
106.
Id.at 75,039 (emphasis added).
107.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,039 (emphasis added).
108.
Id.
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lifetime limit on benefits for the treatment of AIDS, effective before the beginning of the next plan year.
(ii) Conclusion. The facts of this Example 2 strongly suggest that the plan modification is directed at B based on B’s
claim. Absent outweighing evidence to the contrary, the
plan violates this paragraph (b)(2)(i).
...
Example 4. (i) Facts. A group health plan has a $2,000 lifetime limit for the treatment of temporomandibular joint
syndrome (TMJ). The limit is applied uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and is not directed at individual
participants or beneficiaries.
(ii) Conclusion. In this Example 4, the limit does not violate this paragraph (b)(2)(i) because $2,000 of benefits for
the treatment of TMJ are available uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and a plan may limit benefits covered in relation to a specific disease or condition if the limit
applies uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and is
not directed at individual participants or beneficiaries . . . .
Example 5. (i) Facts. A group health plan applies a $2 million lifetime limit on all benefits. However, the $2 million
lifetime limit is reduced to $10,000 for any participant or
beneficiary covered under the plan who has a congenital
heart defect.
(ii) Conclusion. In this Example 5, the lower lifetime limit
for participants and beneficiaries with a congenital heart
defect violates this paragraph (b)(2)(i) because benefits under the plan are not uniformly available to all similarly
situated individuals and the plan’s lifetime limit on benefits
does not apply uniformly to all similarly situated individuals.
Example 6. (i) Facts. A group health plan limits benefits
for prescription drugs to those listed on a drug formulary.
The limit is applied uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and is not directed at individual participants or
beneficiaries.
(ii) Conclusion. In this Example 6, the exclusion from coverage of drugs not listed on the drug formulary does not

53

54

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

violate this paragraph (b)(2)(i) because benefits for prescription drugs listed on the formulary are uniformly available to all similarly situated individuals and because the
exclusion of drugs not listed on the formulary applies uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and is not directed at individual participants or beneficiaries.109
From the Act, the conference agreement, and these examples, a threepart formula emerges that can be used to analyze whether a benefit limitation is discriminatory: (1) is the group in question a group of similarly situated individuals; (2) does the benefit limitation apply uniformly to all similarly situated individuals; and (3) is the benefit limitation directed at individual participants or beneficiaries.110
2.

The Argument in Support of the View That Specialty Drug Tiers Do
Not Violate HIPAA’s Anti-Discrimination Provisions
(i) What is an Acceptable Grouping of Similarly Situated Individuals Under HIPAA?

The first step in analyzing whether four-tier drug plans violate
HIPAA’s anti-discrimination provisions is to identify potential groupings of
similarly situated individuals. There are three groups to consider here. The
first is the group of covered individuals who need the drugs on a specialty
tier, the second is the group of covered individuals using the plan’s drug
benefit at any tier, and the third is the group of all covered participants and
beneficiaries, which we will refer to as all enrollees.
Are all of these appropriate groups under HIPAA? The full group of
all enrollees is an acceptable group under HIPAA because they have identified themselves based on the need, or the potential need, for the benefits
offered under the plan, not any current medical condition. The identifier for
the entire group of enrollees is completely neutral; it is the desire for financial security that identifies the group, not health status.
But what about the subgroups of people who need the drugs on a specialty tier and the larger subgroup of all people using the drug benefit at any
tier? In the conference agreement, Congress stated that a “plan or coverage
may not deny coverage for prescription drugs to a particular beneficiary or
dependent if such coverage is available to other similarly situated individuals covered under the plan or coverage.”111 According to the conference
109.
Id. at 75,039-40.
110.
See id.
111.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-736, at 187 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990, 2000.
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agreement, similarly situated “means that a plan or coverage would be permitted to vary benefits available to different groups of employees, such as
full-time versus part-time employees . . . in different geographic locations .
. . [or] have different benefit [structures] for different collective bargaining
units.”112 It is noteworthy that Congress viewed similarly situated groups
mainly in employment-status terms. That is, Congress chose to draw a distinction between full-time employees and part-time employees, or between
different bargaining units. For example, a school has teachers represented
by a teachers’ union, janitors are represented by the laborers’ union, and
bus drivers are represented by a transportation workers’ union. Congress
did not provide any example showing individuals with similar health conditions as a “similarly situated” group.
Nevertheless, those who would advocate that the existence of a specialty tier group does not violate HIPAA would argue that the examples of
“similarly situated” groups used by the conference agreement do not limit
such groupings to those based on employment status only. Employment
status was used as an example because it is a neutral identifier. The people
in the employment status groups were not identified based on their health
status or medical condition, which HIPAA would not allow. Any identifier
which is neutral, which does not use health status or medical condition to
identify the group, is acceptable under HIPAA.113 The group of people who
need specialty tier drugs is an appropriate HIPAA grouping because the
common identifier is the utilization of the very high-cost drug. Drugs are
placed on specialty drug tiers because of their high cost, without regard to
the diseases those drugs treat. Whenever a person becomes a member of
such group, it is not because of an impermissible identifier such as health
status; it is because of a permissible, neutral identifier—cost. Therefore, the
argument goes, the specialty tier group is an appropriate grouping within
which to measure whether “similarly situated” individuals are treated uniformly.
Similarly, the group of all people using any tier of the drug coverage
would be an acceptable grouping because it is simply the need for the particular benefit that identifies the grouping, not the medical condition that
requires the drug. To conclude otherwise would be to say there can never be
acceptable groupings of “similarly situated” individuals under HIPAA,
which, of course, is nonsensical.

112.
Id.
113.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,039.
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(ii) The Benefit Limitation Must Apply Uniformly to Similarly Situated Individuals
According to the Commentary in the Final Rule, a proposal to limit
benefits within a plan or coverage will comport with HIPAA as long as
benefits are uniformly available to all similarly situated individuals.114 The
Final Rule’s Commentary, Part 2590.702(b)(2), supports a contention that a
specialty tier is permissible under HIPAA.115 The Commentary provides
that “any restriction on a benefit . . . must apply uniformly to all similarly
situated individuals and must not be . . . based on any health factor of the
participants or beneficiaries.”116 Thus, a benefit plan “may limit or exclude
benefits in relation to a specific disease or condition, [or] limit or exclude
benefits for certain types of treatments or drugs . . . but only if the benefit
limitation or exclusion applies uniformly to all similarly situated individuals.”117 Basically, any time a plan or coverage excludes or limits coverage
for a specific benefit, the exclusion or limitation must apply equally to
every person within the affected grouping of similarly situated individuals.
If the relevant grouping is all persons needing the specialty drugs, then
the very high copayments must be applied uniformly to all who are in the
group using those specialty drugs. If the relevant grouping of similarly situated individuals is all enrollees, or all enrollees accessing any drug benefit
tier, then the very high copayments must be applied uniformly to people
from those groups who need the specialty drugs. Because a specialty tier,
which imposes higher cost-sharing requirements, is a restriction on a pharmacy benefit that affects every person in a permissible grouping equally,
specialty tier drug plans treat similarly situated individuals uniformly.
Part 2590.702(b)(2)(D), Example 4, is most analogous to specialty
drug tiers, and bolsters the position that such formularies are not problematic:
Example 4. (i) Facts. A group health plan has a $2,000 lifetime limit for the treatment of temporomandibular joint
syndrome (TMJ). The limit is applied uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and is not directed at individual
participants or beneficiaries.
(ii) Conclusion. In this Example 4, the limit does not violate this paragraph (b)(2)(i) because $2,000 of benefits for
the treatment of TMJ are available to all similarly situated
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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individuals and a plan may limit benefits covered in relation to a specific disease or condition if the limit applies
uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and is not directed at individual participants or beneficiaries.118
Example 4 is a key example because it shows that a plan can identify a
specific health condition, temporomandibular joint syndrome (TMJ), adopt
a limitation on coverage for the condition, and not violate HIPAA’s discrimination provisions. There is no violation in Example 4 because every
person in the relevant grouping is equally subjected to the $2000 lifetime
limit on TMJ coverage. Likewise, creating a specialty tier formulary does
not violate HIPAA because every person in the pertinent group of similarly
situated individuals is subjected to the same cost-sharing requirements. For
example, if a formulary requires a fifty dollar copayment for Aptivus, as
long as every person in the insurance pool who is prescribed Aptivus pays
the same out-of-pocket copayment of fifty dollars, the plan remains lawful
under HIPAA. Moreover, even when an individual with TMJ reaches his or
her $2000 lifetime limit, all other coverage continues unaffected. Comparably, a person’s overall health care benefit is not affected when a plan places
limitations on specialty drugs.
Example 6 provides additional support for the conclusion that specialty drug tiers are consistent with HIPAA because the example demonstrates the government’s acceptance of drug formularies at a time when
federal policymakers were aware of emerging Specialty tier plans:119
Example 6. (i) Facts. A group health plan limits benefits
for prescription drugs to those listed on a drug formulary.
The limit is applied uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and is not directed at individual participants or
beneficiaries.
(ii) Conclusion. In this Example 6, the exclusion from coverage of drugs not listed on the drug formulary does not
violate this paragraph (b)(2)(i) because benefits for prescription drugs listed on the formulary are uniformly available to all similarly situated individuals and because the
exclusion of drugs not listed on the formulary applies uni-

118.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,039-40.
119.
Id. at 75,040.
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formly to all similarly situated individuals and is not directed at individual participants or beneficiaries.120
This example shows that formularies are considered to be applied uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and that formularies, in general,
are not viewed as discriminatory. This is important for two reasons. First,
specialty tier plans (formularies with four or more tiers) have existed since
the mid-1990s, well before the final rulemaking was in place, leading to the
conclusion that federal policymakers implicitly approved of multiple drug
tier structures notwithstanding the complexity of the benefit design.121 Furthermore, the United States Department of Health and Human Services,
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the major federal agency involved with the promulgation of the Final Rule, was intimately involved
with the implementation of Medicare Part D, which included provisions
endorsing tiered benefit structures.122 It would be difficult to conclude that
an agency supportive of drug formularies in 1996, and supportive of more
complex tier structures in 2003 during Medicare Part D, would oppose specialty drug tiers.
Further evidence of the federal government’s support, either explicit or
implicit, can be found in the myriad of approved contracts that procure
health and life insurance benefits for federal employees. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which oversees the Federal Employees Health
Benefits (FEHB) Program, annually contracts with over 250 private sector
firms to provide health and life insurance benefits to over eight million federal government employees.123 With only a cursory overview of the approved benefit plan contracts available online, one can quickly determine
that this federal agency has approved many specialty tier plans that carve
out specialty medications and attach higher copayments. For example, the
2009 contract in effect between the OPM and PersonalCare Insurance of
Illinois, which provides health care benefits to federal government employees in sixty-five Illinois counties, shows that a plan requiring higher co120.
Id.
121.
See Donna Young, Humana Adds Fourth Tier to Drug Benefit Plans, ONLINE
NEWS:
A M.
SYS.
OF
HEALTH-SYS.
PHARMACISTS,
(June
15,
2001),
http://www.ashp.org/menu/News/PharmacyNews/NewsArticle.aspx?id=618 (noting that
specialty drug tiers equaled about one percent of the market share in 2001, five years before
the final HIPAA anti-discrimination rulemaking).
122.
Walsh, supra note 2, at 7. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(1)(E) (2006)
(providing that Medicare Prescription Drug Plans are not required to accept insurance risk);
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3) (recognizing the existence of “tiered cost-sharing formularies”).
123.
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program Handbook, U.S. OFF. OF
PERSONNEL
MGMT.
(2009),
http://www.opm.gov/insure/health/reference/handbook/fehb00.asp.
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payments for specialty drugs has government approval.124 Specifically, the
approved plan mandates a copayment of “20% for name brand formulary
self administered injectables” and “40% for name brand non-formulary self
administered injectibles.”125 The OPM recently commented on the approval
of plans with specialty drug tiers, stating that one contractor made a convincing argument that charging a percentage of the cost of these drugs
“helped lower the rates for federal employees.”126
Based on the widespread acceptance of formularies and the reasonable
assumption that the federal government does not oppose specialty tier
plans—neither at the time HIPAA’s Final Rule was promulgated, nor today
as evidenced by OIM’s endorsement in 2009 contracts—it is reasonable to
conclude that specialty tier plans would be found to comport with HIPAA’s
anti-discrimination provisions.
(iii) The Benefit Limitation is Not Directed at Individual Participants or Beneficiaries
The final prong of the argument in favor of specialty drug tiers is that
proposed specialty drug tiers do not violate HIPAA’s anti-discrimination
because the benefit structure is not directed at individual participants or
beneficiaries enrolled in the plan. The Final Rule’s Commentary in Part
2590.702(b)(2)(C) provides that “a plan amendment applicable to all individuals in one or more groups of similarly situated individuals under the
plan and made effective no earlier than the first day of the plan year after
the amendment is adopted is not considered to be directed at any individual
participants or beneficiaries.”127 Therefore, unless proof can be offered during a plan year that an insured was specifically targeted, the ability to challenge the plan ends when the plan adopts a policy term of general applicability effective on the first day of the next policy year.
The United States Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security
Administration, includes frequently asked questions about the HIPAA nondiscrimination requirements on its website.128 The website notes:
124.
Official Statement of Benefits of Personal Care Insurance Under Contract with
the United States Office of Personnel Management, U.S. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT.,
CENTER FOR RETIREMENT & INS. SERVS. 38 (2009), http://www.opm.gov/insure/
health/planinfo/2009/brochures/73-257.pdf.
125.
Id.
126.
Kolata, supra note 1.
127.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,039 (Dec. 13, 2006) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 146).
128.
FAQ’s About the HIPAA Nondiscrimination Requirements, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.
EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_hipaa_ND.html (last visited
Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN.].
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Question: Can plans exclude or limit benefits for certain
conditions or treatments?
[Answer:] Group health plans may exclude coverage for a
specific disease, limit or exclude benefits for certain types
of treatments or drugs, or limit or exclude benefits based on
a determination that the benefits are experimental or medically unnecessary - but only if the benefit restriction applies uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and is
not directed at individual participants or beneficiaries based
on a health factor they may have. (Plan amendments that
apply to all individuals in a group of similarly situated individuals and that are effective no earlier than the first day
of the next plan year after the amendment is adopted are
not considered to be directed at individual participants and
beneficiaries.)129
So it would seem that as long as plans are not taking mid-year steps to
alter the benefits of a specific individual or small groups of individuals, a
tier for specialty drugs would be acceptable. Indeed, proponents of specialty
drug tiers might suggest that the Department of Labor is saying Part
2590.702(b)(2)(C) of the Final Rule creates a conclusive presumption that a
plan amendment is not directed at individual participants or beneficiaries if
it is adopted at the start of the next plan year.130 Moreover, HIPAA’s provisions do not
require a group health plan . . . to provide particular benefits other than those provided under the terms of such plan
or coverage, or . . . to prevent such a plan . . . from establishing limitations or restrictions on the amount, level, extent, or nature of the benefits or coverage for similarly situated individuals enrolled in the plan or coverage.131
According to congressional intent, this language means that a health plan
“cannot knowingly be designed to exclude individuals and their dependents
[from obtaining or continuing in health care coverage] on the basis of health
status.”132 The language also should be interpreted to allow a health insurance plan to include “generally applicable terms” that “have a disparate
129.
Id. (emphasis added).
130.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,039.
131.
29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2006).
132.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-736, at 186 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990, 1999.
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impact on individual enrollees . . . a plan may exclude all coverage of a
specific condition, or may include a lifetime cap on benefits, or a lifetime
cap on specific benefits.”133
Consequently, a specialty tier formulary designed to be effective at the
beginning of the next plan year, that applies the benefit structure uniformly
to all similarly situated individuals in the pertinent groupings will not be
found to be discriminatory even if it has a disparate impact on individual
enrollees.
3. The Opposing Argument: Specialty Drug Tiers Violate HIPAA’s AntiDiscrimination Provisions
Alternatively, specialty drug tiers could be found to violate HIPAA’s
anti-discrimination provisions if similarly situated individuals are not
treated uniformly or the benefit structure is viewed as being directed at individuals based on health factors, a practice prohibited by HIPAA’s antidiscrimination provisions.
(i) Similarly Situated Groups
The argument that specialty drug tiers violate HIPAA begins by attacking the characterization of specialty tier users as an acceptable grouping
of similarly situated individuals. In order to determine whether this grouping is acceptable under HIPAA, you have to go beyond the stated, facially
neutral identifier of cost and look at the participants singled out by the identifier. Persons who need specialty medications are small in number. One
estimate shows that individuals in need of specialty medications comprise
only one percent of the market share.134 These individuals are very sick and
could have been identified just as easily by their illnesses, such as a specific
cancer or AIDS. These smaller groups theoretically exist within every
group Congress identified in its conference agreement—full-time employees, part-time employees, and all collective bargaining units. Each of these
groupings includes myriad subsets of people—for example, some people
need specialty medications, others have heart disease, while others are in
the process of child bearing. Thus, classifying individuals by a specific
health status factor was not what Congress intended when it enacted
HIPAA.

133.
Id.
134.
Young, supra note 121 (reporting that specialty medications are new to the
market, and because utilization is low—about 1 percent of prescribed drugs—most biotech
drugs appear on the formulary’s fourth tier).
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The congressional conference agreement provides that coverage “cannot require a premium or contribution which is greater than such premium
or contribution for a similarly situated individual enrolled in the plan on the
basis of any health status-related factor . . . .”135 The legislative history also
shows that Congress intended that
these provisions preclude insurance companies from . . .
charging [beneficiaries] higher premiums based on their
health status and other related factors that could lead to
higher health costs. This does not mean that an entire
group cannot be charged more. But it does preclude health
plans from singling out individuals in the group for higher
premiums or dropping them from coverage altogether.136
When the purpose and effect of the cost identifier for specialty drug
tiers is fully understood, it becomes clear that its purpose is to accomplish
indirectly that which could not be accomplished directly, i.e. the creation of
a group based on health status. HIPAA’s Final Rule, when examined
closely, supports this contention. The rulemaking’s commentary in relation
to similarly situated individuals, found at Part 2590.702(d), indicates that “a
plan or issuer may treat participants as two or more distinct groups of similarly situated individuals if the distinction between or among the groups . . .
is based on a bona fide employment-based classification.”137 The commentary further provides that “a classification based on any health factor is not
a bona fide employment-based classification . . . .”138 The commentary next
asserts that
if the creation or modification of an employment or coverage classification is directed at individual participants or
beneficiaries based on any health factor . . . the classification is not permitted . . . . Thus, if an employer modified an
employment-based classification to single out, based on a
health factor, individual participants and beneficiaries and
deny them health coverage, the new classification would
not be permitted.139

135.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-736, at 187 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990, 2000 (emphasis added).
136.
Id. (emphasis added).
137.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,041 (Dec. 13, 2006) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 146).
138.
Id.
139.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Therefore, in connection with scrutinizing a four-tier drug benefit
structure, those persons needing specialty tier drugs is not an acceptable
grouping. To conclude otherwise would be to eliminate the antidiscrimination provisions entirely. All it would take to avoid the antidiscrimination provisions would be to define the group of similarly situated
individuals so narrowly that it would be impossible to show that the members of the group were not treated identically. Consequently, all the proponents’ arguments based on specialty tier individuals being an acceptable
grouping under HIPAA must fail.
The same definitional issue dooms the grouping of all enrollees as being an acceptable grouping under HIPAA when analyzing the propriety of
specialty tier drug plans. Just as defining the group of similarly situated
individuals narrowly obscures improper discrimination, so too does defining the group too broadly. It is simply not appropriate to allow improper
discrimination for the reason that the plan discriminates improperly against
everyone. The only grouping of similarly situated individuals that satisfies
HIPAA and shines any light on the issue whether four-tier drug plans improperly discriminate based on health status or medical condition is the
group of all enrollees accessing the drug benefit on any tier. And so the
next question to be answered is whether specialty drug tiers treat persons
needing those drugs the same as persons who need drugs listed on the formulary’s other tiers.
(ii) Specialty Tier Drug Plans Do Not Apply Uniformly to Similarly
Situated Individuals
The examples in the Final Rule provide help answering the question
whether specialty tier plans apply uniformly to all similarly situated individuals. Part 2590.702(b)(2)(D) of the Final Rule includes several examples
that can guide the analysis to this question. Example 5 provides:
(i) Facts. A group health plan applies a $2 million lifetime
limit on all benefits. However, the $2 million lifetime limit
is reduced to $10,000 for any participant or beneficiary
covered under the plan who has a congenital heart defect.
(ii) Conclusion. In this Example 5, the lower lifetime limit
for participants and beneficiaries with a congenital heart
defect violates this paragraph (b)(2)(i) because benefits under the plan are not uniformly available to all similarly
situated individuals and the plan’s lifetime limit on benefits
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does not apply uniformly to all similarly situated individuals.140
The hypothetical facts show an employer who sponsored a group
health plan for seven employees, and all of the employees had an identical
benefit package.141 Six of the seven employees had the same job title; however, employee G had a different job title.142 Employee G then files an expensive health care claim and subsequently the employer modifies the
health care coverage for employees with G’s job title only.143 According to
the commentary, “changing the coverage classification for G based on the
existing employment classification . . . is not permitted . . . because the
creation of the new coverage classification for G is directed at G based on
one or more health factors.”144 The plan violates HIPAA because benefits
are not uniformly available to all similarly situated individuals.145 Unless
every person in the pertinent grouping has the same lifetime limits, the
plan’s services are not similarly available to all plan enrollees. The plan
also violates the law because the plan’s limitation does not apply uniformly
to all similarly situated individuals.146 Basically, a plan can provide a benefit limitation if the distinction is drawn by bona fide employment-based
classifications, but the plan violates the law when the benefit limitation
breaks out groups by health factors.
In the context of specialty tier plans, the question is whether a formulary’s design that classifies drugs by disease is improper because it creates a
scheme that does not apply uniformly to all similarly situated individuals.
The critical conclusion that must be drawn here is that a specialty tier plan
does not apply uniformly to all enrollees. Instead, persons with certain
medical conditions are treated differently than other similarly situated individuals because of their disease state.
But, are specialty tier plans dramatically different from traditional
three-tier plans? Is it important to draw a distinction? Example 6 shows that
the government finds drug formularies do not violate HIPAA because formularies “are uniformly available to all similarly situated individuals and
because the exclusion of drugs not listed on the formulary applies uniformly to all similarly situated individuals and is not directed at individual

140.
Id. at 75,040.
141.
Id. at 75,042.
142.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,042.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
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participants or beneficiaries.”147 However, the example does not indicate if
it was analyzed in light of a traditional three-tier plan or if, in fact, the government considered four-tier plans as well when it created Example 6. Nevertheless, specialty tier plans can be distinguished from a traditional threetier formulary because specialty drug tiers carve out a group of drugs by
disease state, whereas traditional three-tier plans apply uniformly regardless
of disease state. For example, in a three-tier plan, generally, every disease
state has a treatment drug appear on each tier; however, the same is not true
with drugs on a fourth tier as most do not have acceptable, alternative products. Thus, specialty tier plans are quite different than their predecessors
and drawing a distinction between each plan design can be important, especially because it may make Example 6 inapplicable to the present analysis.
Furthermore, as we stated earlier, with the first three tiers in a multitier structure, consumers have a choice between medications for the same
disease or health condition; that is, a chemically equivalent, lower-cost
choice (most likely a generic drug) is available in place of a higher-cost,
brand-name medication.148 There is no such choice available to those who
need specialty drugs. The first three tiers remain consistent with the insurance industry’s long-standing mission to minimize moral hazard in insurance149 by giving consumers an incentive to make more informed, costconscious choices when filling a prescription and purposefully selecting a
brand-name medication over its generic equivalent. The ability to have a
choice is critical to understanding the true nature of specialty drug tiers.
The first three tiers provide the users of the drug benefit a choice between
more and less expensive equivalent medications for the same disease or
health condition. That is, someone prescribed a Tier 3 drug who did not
want to pay the higher copayment could find an equivalent drug on Tiers 1
or 2 at a lower cost. There are no such choices available to those who need
147.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,040.
148.
A generic drug is “[a] medication whose active ingredient, safety, and quality
will produce the same effects as the brand name drug.” See Four-Tier Prescription Drug
Benefit,
PARAMOUNT
HEALTH
CARE
(July
2011),
http://www.paramounthealthcare.com/documents/prescription-drugs/four-tier-benefit.pdf
(the generic drugs produce the same effects as the comparable brand name drug).
149.
See BAKER, supra note 12, at 4 (describing that “[i]n the insurance context . . .
[]moral hazard[] typically is used to refer to the theoretical tendency for insurance to reduce
incentives (1) to protect against loss or (2) to minimize the cost of a loss.”). As an example,
the author explains that moral hazard is “leaving a car door unlocked, comfortable in the
knowledge that if the car is stolen the insurance company will pay.” Id. Likewise, in a health
insurance context, the same would be true when an insured does not care about the type or
amount of drugs prescribed or the cost difference between a generic and brand-name equivalent medication because the insurance company covers the bulk of the cost. See id. Formulary tiers were designed to combat moral hazard in the insured’s decision when choosing
medications. See id.
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drugs placed on a specialty tier. While three-tier plans provide a tool to
address insured moral hazard that was exacerbated by drug company advertising and by undifferentiated drug reimbursement by insurers, a specialty
tier does nothing to address insured moral hazard.
The final part of the analysis should be considered at this point. Under
HIPAA, a benefit limitation is permitted if, and only if, “it is not directed as
individual participants or beneficiaries.”150 Therefore, does a specialty tier
formulary violate the law because it is a benefit limitation that is directed at
a person’s health status or medical condition?
(iii) Specialty Drug Tiers are Impermissibly Directed at Individual Participants or Beneficiaries
HIPAA’s legislative history and the Final Rule declare that “discrimination directed at individuals” will not be found only if a benefit limitation
applies uniformly to all beneficiaries and “if the creation or modification of
an employment or coverage classification is [not] directed at individual
participants or beneficiaries based on any health factor.”151 According to the
legislative history, a plan cannot knowingly be designed to exclude individuals on the basis of health status.152 While a benefit limitation may have
a disparate impact on certain members of the group, that limitation is not
permissible if it is “directed at individual sick employees or dependents.”153
Part 2590.702(d), Example 2 in the Final Rule prohibits a health plan
from modifying benefits directly related to claims made by plan enrollees
during the course of an ongoing benefit year.154 In this example, a plan provided a $2 million lifetime limit for all plan enrollees but reduced the lifetime cap mid-year to $10,000 for persons diagnosed with AIDS, where the
evidence strongly suggested that the plan was modified due to the high cost
claims of a known beneficiary diagnosed with AIDS.155 The commentary in
the Final Rule concludes that this violates the anti-discrimination provisions
because the circumstances “strongly” suggested that the plan modification
was directed at the insured person, based on the insured’s claim history.156
A tier for specialty drugs is conceptually identical to Example 2. One pre150.
Id.
151.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,041.
152.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-736, at 186 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990, 1999.
153.
Id. at 187.
154.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,039.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(C) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination
against a person based on claims experience).
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scription drug plan indicated that the creation of specialty drug tiers was
important because only “one to three percent of the population utilizes specialty medications, but . . . account for roughly twenty percent of all pharmaceutical costs.”157 Plans that adopt specialty drug tiers do so to impact a
very small and easily identifiable portion of the enrollee population based
on the high claim costs associated with their medical conditions. A tier targeting specialty drugs is as impermissibly directed at individual enrollees as
the lifetime cap is directed at AIDS patients in Example 2.
Example 2 addressed plan changes made mid-year, but, what if a plan
waits and makes the plan modification effective in the next plan year? Does
implementation of a specialty drug tier at the beginning of a plan year insulate a plan from HIPAA liability? As we said earlier, proponents of specialty drug tiers would say the Department of Labor views Part
2590.702(b)(2)(C) of the Final Rule as conclusively establishing that an
amendment adopted on a plan anniversary was not directed at individual
participants or beneficiaries. The response must be that the Department of
Labor did not mean to raise form over substance. An improperly directed
plan amendment is just as offensive when implemented at the beginning of
a plan year as it is when implemented mid-year. The key is the purpose of
the amendment. While a mid-year implementation may have a stronger
implication of an improper purpose than a plan anniversary implementation,
a plan anniversary implementation alone should not and cannot shield an
amendment improperly directed at individual participants or beneficiaries.
A plan anniversary may be some evidence of a proper purpose, or perhaps
even create a rebuttable presumption of a proper purpose, but actual purpose must be objectively discerned. And with any specialty tier drug plans,
it is clear that the purpose is to identify the sickest members of the similarly
situated grouping and, at their moment of greatest need and vulnerability,
direct onto them a severe financial burden that they cannot avoid by selecting other drugs on less expensive tiers like other similarly situated individuals can do. It becomes clear that specialty drug tiers are directed at
those persons individually.
Example 3 provides instructive commentary.158 In Example 3, a plan
discovers that a participant’s coverage includes benefits for an adverse
health condition, and the next year, the plan offers the participant coverage
but includes a rider stating that the adverse health condition will no longer
157.
See, e.g., PRECISIONRX SPECIALTY SOLUTIONS SPECIALTY DRUG LIST,
http://www.anthem.com/wps/portal/ahpmember?content_path=shared/ky/f0/s0/t0/pw_ad092
969.htm&state=ky&rootLevel=2&label=PrecisionRx%20Specialty%20Solutions (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
158.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,039.
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be covered under the plan.159 The commentary notes that “[e]ven though the
rider is made effective the first day of the next plan year, because the rider
does not apply uniformly to similarly situated individuals, the issuer violates [HIPAA].”160 The proposition that plans that adopt a specialty have
acted improperly, just like in Examples 2 and 3 above, by knowingly modifying their plans under the potentially neutral guise of cost when in fact
they were targeting a small subset of employees identifiable by health status
has some support. The United States Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration, provides on its website answers to frequently
asked questions about the HIPAA nondiscrimination requirements.161 The
site poses the question of whether a plan can charge an individual with a
history of high claims more than similarly situated individuals based on
their claims experience.162 The answer provided was “[n]o . . . plans cannot
charge an individual more for coverage163 than other similarly situated individuals based on any health factor.”164
4. Which Argument Prevails?
It is our belief that the argument that specialty drug tiers violate
HIPAA’s anti-discrimination provisions carries the day. The dispositive
difference between four-tier drug plans with a specialty drug tier and traditional three-tier drug plans is the lack of pharmaceutically equivalent alternative drugs for the specialty drugs that can be placed on one of the first
three tiers. This difference exposes specialty drug tiers for what they are—
blatant discrimination against individuals based on health status.
Yet, we recognize arguments of specialty tier proponents. The law allows a plan to completely exclude coverage, but also prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s health status. This is an odd juxtaposition. The
law, on one hand, sends the message that a plan cannot discriminate against
a person based on medical condition such as AIDS; but, on the other hand,
it is acceptable to completely exclude coverage for all AIDS drugs. Part
2590.702(b)(2)(C) of the Final Rule states that “a plan amendment applicable to all individuals in one or more groups of similarly situated individuals
under the plan and made effective no earlier than the first day of the first
plan year after the amendment is adopted is not considered to be directed at

159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., supra note 128.
162.
Id.
163.
Id. The use of the term “coverage” may infer that Congress meant premiums,
not copayments; although, this is not clear. See id.
164.
Id.
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any individual[s].”165 This statement, although it appears to assert that general plan amendments never create discrimination problems, cannot be entirely dispositive because of the conclusion reached in Example 3.166
Example 3 shows that a health plan, with knowledge of a person’s adverse and costly health condition, cannot modify only one individual’s plan
the following year using a rider to exclude coverage because the limitation
would not apply uniformly to all similarly situated individuals.167 Does this
example have equal applicability if the plan modification was the result of
two people’s claims? How far does this example go before a plan will be
viewed as making a generalized determination versus individualized determinations? For example, the Final Rule asserts that a health plan with 100
members cannot identify one member who has expensive health care needs
and modify only that member’s coverage by a rider that excludes coverage
for the member’s high-cost services. But, the health plan can modify the
benefits offered during the next plan year and exclude this particular benefit
for the entire population, even if the benefit is utilized by this member
alone. This appears like a loophole that Congress may not have intended;
that is, Congress surely approved of health plan modifications that would
have changes applicable to a large number of people but may not have intended to give health plans carte blanche authority to present plan modifications that the plan knows will affect a limited number of people. The ultimate question for specialty tier plans then is whether a formulary change
adding a tier targeting specialty medications that affects a limited number
of people is more analogous to a general plan amendment that is per se
nondiscriminatory, or whether it is more analogous to a rider that affects a
limited number of people that is prohibited by the conclusion provided in
Example 3.
HIPAA’s overall purpose, and more broadly, long-standing insurance
law doctrines, should be utilized to reach a final answer on the legitimacy
of specialty drug tiers. It is hard to imagine a law like HIPAA, with its
stated statutory purpose of increasing access to, and the availability of
health insurance coverage, endorsing a pharmacy benefit design that increases a plan participant’s copayments exponentially by placing specialty
drugs on a separate tier simply because of the high cost of drugs prescribed
for treatment of medical conditions suffered by a small and easily identified
165.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,039.
166.
Compare 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(b)(2)(C) (2006) (concluding that general plan
amendments are not considered to be directed at individuals) with § 2590.702(D), Ex. 3.(ii)
(concluding that, even after a new plan year, a rider that targeted an individual is prohibited
under HIPAA).
167.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,039.

70

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

subset of beneficiaries. The ultimate effect of specialty tier plans is contrary
to HIPAA’s broader intent. HIPAA was crafted to guarantee that Americans had access to affordable health insurance whether or not the person
required high-cost medical care.168 Yet, HIPAA does not mandate insurance
coverage for specific diseases or conditions, not even high-cost medical
services.169 Benefits offered by a plan can be limited as long as the limitation applies uniformly to all persons similarly situated in an insurance
pool.170 From this, the law shows that once a health insurance plan decides
to offer benefits for a specific disease or condition, the plan must be circumscribed within the scope of the law.
If specialty drug tiers do not violate HIPAA’s anti-discrimination provisions specifically, are these benefit structures still wholly inconsistent
with the overall legislative intent of HIPAA to improve the portability and
continuity of health coverage for all insured Americans? If the answer is
yes, can the broader intent of HIPAA be used to defeat four-tier plans? We
believe the answer is yes. Longstanding rules of statutory construction
show that sections of a statute which are inconsistent with the law’s overall
purpose can be defeated.
In the context of discrimination under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), the United States Supreme Court applied rules of
statutory construction and found facially neutral provisions in a law void
because the provisions were inconsistent with the overall purpose of
IDEA.171 In Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School District,
the Supreme Court held that “a proper interpretation of the act requires a
consideration of the entire statutory scheme.”172 In Winkelman, the court
cautioned that courts asked to find that IDEA’s provisions implicitly limit
parents’ rights must carefully consider whether such an interpretation is
contrary to the statute’s main purpose.173 In this case, the court rejected a
plain meaning argument and held that IDEA’s statutory scheme and overriding goals (of ensuring that all children received a free and appropriate

168.
142 CONG. REC. S9521 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (stating that HIPAA was crafted for many reasons, including the need to reject preexisting condition exclusions in health insurance and the necessity of guaranteed access to
health care regardless of health status).
169.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,039; see also EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., supra note 128.
170.
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,039.
171.
Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 523
(2007) (stating, under rules of statutory construction, that a proper interpretation of a law
must consider the entire statutory scheme).
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
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public education, and protecting the rights of parents and children) could
justify looking beyond the language of a single statutory section.174
Applying the analysis used in Winkelman to the present question of
specialty drug tiers, it is possible that HIPAA’s statutory scheme could defeat an argument that the narrower anti-discrimination provisions do not
preclude the creation of specialty drug tiers. However, HIPAA’s statutory
scheme may be difficult to determine because it addressed a number of issues including access to affordable health care, portability of insurance
benefits, privacy of health information, security of health data, health savings accounts, and matters related to taxes.175 However, it is worth noting
that the first comments made by Senator Nancy Kassebaum (D-Kansas), the
lead sponsor of the HIPAA legislation in 1996, focused on discrimination in
health insurance.176 Senator Kassebaum’s initial remarks illustrate that the
primary legislative intent of the statute was to “help . . . 25 million Americans each year who . . . face discrimination and live in fear that their health
insurance . . . will be canceled if they change jobs, lose their job, or become
sick.”177 If HIPAA was truly meant to stop our fear that becoming sick
could lead to the end of health care coverage, then it should be equally improper under HIPAA to create a drug benefit structure that leads to a de
facto end to a person’s prescription drug coverage when the person cannot
afford to make the required copayment. Senator Kassebaum called HIPAA
“a dramatic victory for the American people . . . because [it] will help millions of Americans with preexisting illnesses . . . .”178 However, HIPAA can
become an empty victory if persons with high-cost health care are not protected.179
5.

HIPAA Changes Under the Affordable Care Act

The Affordable Care Act was enacted in March 2010.180 The Affordable Care Act, among many other insurance reforms, made several revisions to HIPAA. In many cases, including certain revisions affecting
HIPAA, the full effect of the Affordable Care Act will not be known for
several years. The salient question here is whether any provision in this new
law alters the HIPAA provisions that form the basis of this Article.
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Crossley, supra note 7, at 113-14.
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142 CONG. REC. S9501 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nancy
Kassebaum).
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Id. (emphasis added).
178.
Id.
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Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).

72

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Section 1302 is the only provision in the Affordable Care Act that may
ultimately impact the conclusions and arguments raised herein. This section
requires the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to define the “essential health benefits” that must be included in
individual and small group health insurance markets.181 The definition of
“essential health benefits” will be used to create subsidized health insurance
packages, which will be sold through a new system of health insurance exchanges beginning in calendar year 2014, and the definition will also be
used outside of the exchange system.
Section 1302 also lists ten general categories of items and services that
must be included in any major medical benefits package.182 The ten general
categories include:
(A) Ambulatory patient services. (B) Emergency services.
(C) Hospitalization. (D) Maternity and newborn care. (E)
Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment. (F) Prescription drugs. (G)
Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices. (H)
Laboratory services. (I) Preventive and wellness services
and chronic disease management. (J) Pediatric services, including oral and vision care.183
Insurance policies must cover these benefits in order to be certified and
offered in health insurance exchanges; Medicaid State plans must cover
these services by 2014.
Congress also requires the HHS Secretary to consider affordability and
choice, as well the scope and value of benefits, when making up the list of
essential benefits.184 Most notably, the central focus of the Affordable Care
Act is on “affordability” of health insurance, and Section 1302 directs HHS
to examine the availability of prescription drugs as a core health service that
must be provided to health insurance beneficiaries.185 However, the Affordable Care Act fails to directly address specialty drug tiers; therefore, the
lawfulness of specialty drug tiers remains uncertain at least for now.
The Institute of Medicine (IOM), in coordination with HHS, established an ad hoc committee in the fall of 2010.186 The committee will even181.
182.
183.
184.
(2010).
185.
186.
Health

Id. at § 1302.
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tually make recommendations on the methods for determining and updating
essential health benefits for qualified health plans that participate in health
insurance exchanges.187 The IOM notes that
the committee will identify the criteria and policy foundations for determination of the essential health benefits offered by [qualified health plans] taking into account benefits as described in sections 1302(b)(1) and 1302(b)(2)(A),
and the committee will assess the methods used by insurers
currently to determine medical necessity and will provide
guidance on the "required elements for consideration" taking into account those outlined in section 1302(b)(4)(A)(G), including ensuring appropriate balance among the
categories of care covered by the essential health benefits,
accounting for the health care needs of diverse segments of
the population, and preventing discrimination against age,
disability, or expected length of life. The committee will
also take into account language in 1302 on periodic review
of essential health benefits, other sections of the Affordable
Care Act, for example, coverage of preventive health services (section 2713), utilization of uniform explanation of
coverage documents and standardized definitions (section
2715), and other relevant tasks found in the Affordable
Care Act for the Secretary of HHS.188
The committee is directed to make an “accounting for the health care
needs of diverse segments of the population” and to define essential health
benefits in light of “preventing discrimination against age, disability or expected length of life.”189 Based on this language, specialty drug tiers appears to be within the committee’s scope of work, at least in the context of
health insurance exchanges and qualifying health plans. The likelihood of
this committee considering specialty drug tiers and copayment amounts
could hinge on the level of exposure New York’s ban on specialty drug
tiers and its progeny get in the national media and whether any opponents
submit comments on specialty drug tiers to the IOM.190 The committee
must publish its recommendations by September 2011.191
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=IOM-HCS-10-04 (last visited
May 29, 2011) (announcement by the Institute of Medicine).
187.
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188.
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189.
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191.
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The Affordable Care Act is silent on specialty drug tiers. In addition,
the IOM committee may not address specialty drug tiers during its deliberations on essential health benefits. Thus, national health reform does not
presently alter existing law, regulations, and guidance related to HIPAA’s
anti-discrimination provisions or its overall intent to ensure access to necessary health care services.
IV. CONCLUSION
Reasonable arguments can be made on both sides of the issue addressing whether specialty tier formularies direct the benefit limitation at individual participants, violating HIPAA’s anti-discrimination provisions. We
conclude that specialty drug tiers improperly discriminate in violation of
HIPAA is a more convincing argument. Using cost as the justification for
placing drugs on a specialty tier is a red herring designed to divert our attention away from improper discrimination based on health status. The persons grouped together by the purportedly neutral cost identifier are a very
small subset of an insurance pool’s membership and are readily identifiable
by their individual medical conditions. These persons are not treated the
same as similarly situated individuals; they are singled out for placement on
a specialty tier, which makes the cost of their necessary prescription drugs
so high that it is effectively a substantial limitation on the amount they can
obtain or a de facto denial of the drug altogether. Moreover, the nature of
specialty drug tiers is shown by the fact that such tiers are conceptually and
substantively different than the first three tiers in that the cost differential
leaves the participant with no pharmaceutical option in the other three tiers.
Unlike the first three tiers, specialty drug tiers have no legitimate purpose
based in insurance theory, such as dealing with moral hazard. It is nothing
more than a de facto exclusion of certain drugs based on the health status of
the user and a violation of HIPAA’s anti-discrimination provisions.
Consequently, we believe it would be appropriate for state legislatures
to follow New York’s lead and resolve any doubt about the legality of specialty drug tiers by enacting legislation prohibiting their use; for HHS to
issue regulations under the Affordable Care Act prohibiting specialty drug
tiers in qualified health plans participating in the health insurance exchanges set for 2014; and for any other administrative or legislative action
at the federal level to provide a clear, nationally uniform prohibition against
the discriminatory practice of specialty drug tiers.

